Energy Security is National Security

On April 20, 2026, the Trump administration invoked Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) across oil, natural gas, LNG, power generation, grid infrastructure, and coal.

The federal government is now stating explicitly that energy production and infrastructure shortfalls now constitute a national defense risk, and that market forces, permitting regimes, and capital markets cannot be relied on to fix them fast enough.

Clearly President Trump intends to make United States “energy dominance” a reality through direct action. But this is very much a domestic move regardless of any international implications. And it’s not symbolic.

Trump has not been quiet about the importance of American energy. And he has not only promoted American energy for export but considering the super refinery that has been in the works for years, he is likely the one to get it over the line into production by 2027, showing he is definitely looking both internally and externally.

What is Section 303?

Section 303 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) is a federal authority that allows the President to intervene in the economy to ensure the U.S. has enough materials and infrastructure for national defense.

The DPA was created during the Korean War (1950-1953), and Section 303 was immediately used to build industries we recognize today, such as:

• Aluminum and Titanium: The government used purchase commitments to guarantee a market for these metals, which were essential for building jet aircraft.
• Synthetic Rubber: To reduce reliance on natural rubber from Southeast Asia, Section 303 was used to fund and expand the domestic synthetic rubber industry.

During the Cold War and the Space Race, the DPA was used for the race to be technologically superior.

• Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics: Because the market for chips that could survive space or nuclear environments was too small for commercial companies to pursue on their own, the Department of Defense used Section 303 to fund specialized manufacturing lines.
• Supercomputers: The government used purchase commitments to act as the “first customer” for early supercomputers, providing companies like Cray Research the capital needed to continue innovating.

In more modern times section 303 was used to get medical supplies rather than military hardware.

• Ventilators and PPE: The government provide loans and financial incentives to companies like Ford and GM to retool their factories to produce ventilators.
• Vaccine Components: It was also used to secure “bottleneck” items for vaccine production, such as specialized glass vials and filters, ensuring that supply chain shortages didn’t halt the rollout.

President Biden also used the DPA section 303 to target renewable energy.

• Electric Vehicle (EV) Batteries: The DPA was invoked to support the domestic mining and processing of critical minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt. This was intended to reduce reliance on foreign adversaries for the materials needed for modern high-tech defense systems and the consumer economy.
• Heat Pumps and Insulation: Financial support was authorized to expand the domestic manufacturing of energy-efficient appliances to reduce overall national energy demand.

If one considers critical assets, like natural gas pipelines or power grid equipment, and building them is slow due to high costs or regulatory delays, Section 303 allows the government the power to step in with financial support and purchase guarantees.

By invoking this section, the administration can treat energy projects as “defense resources,” effectively fast-tracking their development and providing the capital needed to bypass market bottlenecks and strengthen national security.

So, essentially, section 303 allows the federal government to:

• Make purchase commitments
• Provide financing or guarantees
• Support capacity expansion or reopening idled assets
• Waive normal statutory sequencing requirements

In Trump’s five April determinations (petroleum, natural gas, coal, electricity grid, and other energy infrastructure), the White House is basically saying that:

1. These energy assets are essential to national defense
2. Private industry cannot deliver capacity in time under current conditions
3. Federal action is the least‑cost, most expedient solution

Natural Gas: Strategic

The memo on natural gas explicitly links U.S. gas infrastructure to allied energy security and defense readiness, arguing that inadequate export or transmission capacity leaves partners exposed in crises.

Clearly now we are talking about the war in Iran and the lack of natural gas flowing to Europe and Asia also considering the low storage in Europe that has been mentioned.

This order directly targets natural gas transmission, processing, storage, and LNG capacity, citing the usual suspects causing difficulty in getting the market “cleared”:

• Pipeline and compression bottlenecks
• Processing and storage constraints
• Insufficient LNG export capacity for allies

This echoes what data has already shown about pipeline development timelines and capital risk, which I wrote about last week here, analyzing why U.S. gas takeaway capacity persistently lags production growth.

Coal & Baseload Power

Trump famously took a picture kissing coal and there is no doubt that base load power around the world has grown through the use of coal. And for coal the administration argues that:

• Reliable baseload power is indispensable
• Intermittent systems alone cannot support defense installations, industrial load growth, or AI‑driven demand
• Coal supply chains and plant life‑extension are therefore defense‑critical

Of course, this intertwines all energy sources including natural gas because it could signal more gas and coal switching in the future, or simply that it may become a system of greater diversity:

• Gas feeds flexible generation
• Coal stabilizes baseload
• Both rely on grid infrastructure that cannot be quickly expanded

In other words, Trump is saying that power grid resilience is now a defense (security) issue.

Grid Infrastructure: The Elephant in the Room

The memo is targeting grid infrastructure and its upstream supply chains, is reminiscent of President Biden’s order in 2022, but will we see real action this time? All the memos similarly declare, but you can imagine the implication when Trump says the following are included:

“grid infrastructure and its associated upstream supply chains, including transformers, transmission lines and conductors, substations, high-voltage circuit breakers, power control electronics, protective relay systems, capacitor banks, electrical core steel, and related raw materials and manufacturing tools, are industrial resources, materials, or critical technology items essential to the national defense”

Geopolitics Is the Subtext and sometimes the Main Text

Roughly one‑fifth of global oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and the DPA invocations not only are explicitly meant to reduce exposure to that chokepoint by accelerating U.S. oil and gas capacity, but also to support allies.

On LNG specifically: global gas markets are impacted greatly by chokepoints and geopolitics. Domestic capacity is ever more valuable when it can reach global markets to allies as well.

RBAC’s James Brooks wrote about Chokepoints here.

Legal Risk: It’s Never That Simple

Recent uses of the DPA to restart or override stalled energy infrastructure (most notably offshore pipelines in California) have triggered legal challenges.

The core legal challenges focus on:

• Federal preemption vs. state permitting authority
• Environmental review circumvention
• Use of emergency powers outside declared wars [did heat pumps relate to Ukraine?]

DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel has gone further, suggesting DPA orders may preempt conflicting state law entirely when national defense is invoked. Now, that is likely to be tested in court and I won’t personally dwell on the merits either way. But rather, this is simply a matter of risk management companies will have to consider as it cuts both ways:

• Projects previously considered “un‑permittable” may re‑enter play
• But there is litigation risk, and future regulatory uncertainty [Trump has 3 years left and even November elections could impact things]

What This Means for Natural Gas in Practical Terms

Considering Trump has declared that “natural gas and LNG capacity, including gathering and transmission pipelines, compression, processing plants, underground storage, LNG liquefaction, storage and marine load, export facilities, and critical distribution infrastructure, are industrial resources, materials, or critical technology items” are essential to national defense, clearly upstream, midstream and downstream Natural Gas and LNG will all be materially impacted.

It is a beacon signaling:

• production without takeaway is a defense liability
• pipelines, compression, and storage are not “optional” infrastructure
• LNG is a security export, not simply another commodity
• Terminals are “alliance infrastructure” if you will

Final Thought

But what does all this really mean?

It’s a fantastic recognition to basic energy security facts. But until the pipes are in the ground and the fuel is flowing or transported, it may not be able to be called a true structural shift.

The DPA actions are definitely an acknowledgement that energy systems are brittle, infrastructure takes too long to build, and market resilience has lagged. Energy security seems to be the brightest neon sign flashing; not because it’s everything, but because nothing works without it.

Certainly, natural gas will be pivotal in the mix and players that understand how all the pieces will interplay against each other will be way ahead of the game.

If you read my three-part piece on pipelines, you’ll understand how modelling tools enable this.

Best of luck to you.

Let’s make better energy decisions.